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BALANCING INTERESTS UNDER SECTION
230(C) OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY
ACT: USING THE SWORD AS WELL AS THE
SHIELD
Andrew R. Klein*
Perhaps no existing law faces more scrutiny than Section 230(c)
of the Communications Decency Act (“Section 230(c)”). At one level, it
is a simple edict: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.” At another level, the law packs
a punch. As author Jeff Kosseff put it in the title of his recent book, Section 230(c) contains “the twenty-six words that created the Internet.”
Enacted a quarter century ago to support a nascent industry, the
law provides expansive immunity for internet companies that post thirdparty content online. The consequences have provoked strong criticism
from both sides of the political aisle. Those on the left assert that Section
230(c) allows large tech companies to profit from conduct that causes
harm. Those on the right argue that it gives social media companies license to engage in viewpoint discrimination. Even one of the law’s original authors, Senator Ron Wyden, recently criticized Section 230(c), calling out tech companies’ lack of interest in self-moderation and warning
that if “you don’t use the sword, there are going to be people coming for
your shield.”
An increasing number of commentators contend that it is time to
rethink Section 230(c). This Article joins the fray by considering some of
its applications that have flown under the radar, including several cases
with fact patterns that have engendered frustratingly inconsistent decisions. In these cases, judges encounter situations where a defendant’s
own conduct is at play—activity beyond simply republishing content. Although this would seem to take such claims outside Section 230(c)’s purview, some courts continue to apply immunity nonetheless, elevating concerns about chilling online activity above all else. The Article takes issue
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Law ‘21) and Sloan Schafer (Indiana University McKinney Law ‘22) for their outstanding research
assistance.
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with those decisions, noting their conflict with analogous principles of
secondary liability and expressing skepticism that broad immunity is necessary to serve the statute’s policy of encouraging activity on the internet.
The Article also proposes a better way for courts to balance interests,
drawing parallels to well-established defamation law principles that
weigh plaintiffs’ ability to protect reputational interests against concerns
about chilling speech.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In his book The Twenty-Six Words That Created the Internet,1 Jeff
Kosseff describes a scene that seems almost quaint. The place was
Washington, D.C., the year 1995. People gathered in person instead of
online. Partisans “did lunch,” seeking common ground on issues
where colleagues had not yet formed hardened views.2 Republican
U.S. Rep. Chris Cox of California and Democratic U.S. Rep. (now
Senator) Ron Wyden of Oregon were prime examples.3 The pair enjoyed a friendship built on a mutual interest in leading-edge issues and
a desire to find forward-looking solutions.4 In early 1995, their conversations turned to a recent New York state judicial opinion, Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,5 in which a court found an internet service provider responsible for defamatory statements that an
anonymous user posted on its site.6
Cox and Wyden worried that widespread adoption of Stratton
Oakmont’s holding would hamper growth of the nascent internet industry.7 They contemplated a different approach, one that would create incentives for companies to moderate online content without overregulation that might stymie innovation.8 The issue is familiar today,
but it was not a quarter century ago. As Kosseff wrote, “[i]t was the
rare type of problem that was so under the radar that Cox and Wyden
could start from scratch on crafting a solution.”9 Even better, the pair
had a window of opportunity, having identified the issue at exactly the
time Congress was overhauling the Communications Act of 1934.10
Internet activity was far from the center of Congress’s mid-1990s
communications debate. Legislators were more concerned about long-

1. JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET (2019).
2. Id. at 58.
3. Id. at 57–59.
4. Id. at 58–59.
5. No. 031063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
6. Id. at *4–5. The court based its ruling not on Prodigy’s approval of what others wrote, but
rather on its failure to adequately moderate the content. Id.; see infra notes 45–47 and accompanying text; Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad
Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 405 (2017); infra Section II.A.
7. KOSSEFF, supra note 1, at 60.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. Others have detailed Cox and Wyden’s efforts from that time. See, e.g., David Lukmire,
Note, Can the Courts Tame the Communications Decency Act?: The Reverberations of Zeran v.
America Online, 66 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 371, 378–81 (2010). This Article briefly recounts
the story here simply to set the stage.
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distance telephone fees than website postings.11 To the extent that
some were thinking about online activity, they had different concerns.
Notably, Senator James Exon of Nebraska had introduced legislation
aimed at imposing criminal penalties on those who knowingly made
“indecent” material available to minors.12 By contrast, Cox and Wyden sought to limit the possibility of sanctions in favor of an approach
that would create space for “individuals and companies to set their
own standards.”13
“We really were interested in protecting the platforms from
being held liable for the content posted on their sites and being sued out of existence,” Wyden said. “And we were interested in allowing the platforms to take down some content
that they believe shouldn’t be on their site without being held
liable for all the content on the site, so that you could really
encourage responsible behavior.”14
Just two weeks after the Senate added Senator Exon’s proposal to
the larger telecommunications bill—and only five weeks after a New
York trial court decided Stratton Oakmont—Cox and Wyden introduced the Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act in the
House.15 This proposal had two components, one that shielded providers or users of online services from liability for taking good faith steps
to restrict access to objectionable material,16 and another that became
the twenty-six words that changed the internet17: “No provider or user
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as a publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.”18
11. KOSSEFF, supra note 1, at 61 (“At the time, the primary focus of the telecommunications
law debate was allowing the Baby Bell telephone companies to offer long-distance service in exchange for letting competitors use their lines to offer competing local service. The Internet was a
shiny new object, but online platforms were largely an afterthought.”).
12. Id. at 62–64 (explaining how Exon’s proposal became the Communications Decency Act
of 1995).
13. Id. at 63; see Citron & Wittes, supra note 6, at 405–06.
14. KOSSEFF, supra note 1, at 64.
15. Id.; see Citron & Wittes, supra note 6, at 406.
16. KOSSEFF, supra note 1, at 64–65; 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2018) (“No provider or user of
an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of—(A) any action voluntarily taken
in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make
available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).”).
17. KOSSEFF, supra note 1, at 64.
18. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
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Cox and Wyden’s intent was clear. They sought to encourage
online activity through robust liability protection for internet service
providers.19 Their bill drew little opposition and garnered scant media
attention.20 In the broader context of debate over the Communications
Act, it “was a footnote,”21 relevant to an industry that was a small fraction of its size today.
During the next few months, the Senate and House worked on
separate versions of a revised Communications Act. Regarding the internet proposals, the Senate version contained Exon’s amendment; the
House version contained Cox and Wyden’s.22 Eventually, a conference committee compromised, including both proposals in the final
legislation.23 The provisions took the title of Exon’s original bill and
became known collectively as the Communications Decency Act.24 In
February of that year, both chambers of Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996, including the Communications Decency
Act.25 A week later, President Bill Clinton signed it into law.26 That
same day, a group of civil rights advocates filed suit challenging
Exon’s provision as violating the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.27 A lower court agreed,28 and about a year later, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously affirmed.29 All that remained of the Communications Decency Act was Cox and Wyden’s liability shield for a
growing and dynamic group of entities.
In the intervening twenty-five years, numerous courts have interpreted the language of section 230(c) of the Communications Decency
Act (“Section 230(c)”), many viewing the statute quite broadly and
protecting internet companies from liability for the consequences of
online postings from the mundane to the horrific.30 At the same time,
19. KOSSEFF, supra note 1, at 67; Benjamin Volpe, Comment, From Innovation to Abuse:
Does the Internet Still Need Section 230 Immunity?, 68 CATH. U. L. REV. 597, 600 (2019) (“[Section] 230 of the Act remains as a declaration of Congress’s 1996 policy choice to make the internet
free and unregulated.”); see infra note 51 and accompanying text (listing policies behind section
230).
20. KOSSEFF, supra note 1, at 67.
21. Id. (citing interview with Jerry Berman, June 23, 2017).
22. Id. at 70.
23. Id. at 71–72.
24. Id. at 72.
25. Id. at 73.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 74.
28. Id. at 74–75.
29. Reno v. Am. C.L. Union, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
30. See infra notes 53–57 and accompanying text.
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the internet grew in a way that few could have imagined. Today, “providers of interactive computer services” are not a collection of underthe-radar start-ups and entrepreneurs. Some are economic and cultural
behemoths, with power perhaps unrivaled in history.31
The current political environment is different, too. Without making the mid-1990s appear as a pinnacle of bonhomie (it wasn’t),32 the
degree of rancor in today’s Washington makes the possibility of bipartisanship and compromise illustrated by the run-up to the Communications Decency Act less likely. On the other hand, if one thing has
unified politicians of different stripes in recent years, it is a belief that
that the time has come to revisit section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act (“Section 230”)—and particularly Section 230(c).
Critics come from different political perspectives. Those on the
right argue that Section 230(c) gives social media companies license
to engage in viewpoint discrimination.33 Those on the left assert that
it lets tech companies profit from conduct that harms others.34 Even
Senator Wyden has criticized Section 230(c), recently calling out tech
companies’ apparent lack of interest in self-moderation and warning
that if “you don’t use the sword, there are going to be people coming
for your shield.”35 Section 230(c) has few flat-out defenders,36 and an

31. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SECTION 230—NURTURING INNOVATION OR FOSTERING
UNACCOUNTABILITY?: KEY TAKEAWAYS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (June 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/file/1286331/download [https://perma.cc/76KP-9X3Z] (“The internet has
changed dramatically in the 25 years since Section 230’s enactment in ways that no one, including
the drafters of Section 230, could have predicted. Several online platforms have transformed into
some of the nation’s largest and most valuable companies, and today’s online services bear little
resemblance to the rudimentary offerings in 1996.”).
32. See STEVE KORNACKI, THE RED AND THE BLUE: THE 1990S AND THE BIRTH OF
POLITICAL TRIBALISM 5 (2018).
33. Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, The Internet as a Speech Machine and Other
Myths Confounding Section 230 Reform, 2020 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 46–47 (“Today, politicians across
the ideological spectrum are raising concerns about the leeway provided to content platforms under
Section 230. . . . Although their assessments of the problem differ, lawmakers agree that Section
230 needs fixing.”); see, e.g., Abram Brown, What is Section 230—and Why Does Trump Want to
Change It?, FORBES (May 28, 2020, 2:26 PM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2020/05/
28/what-is-section-230-and-why-does-trump-want-to-change-it/ [https://perma.cc/9368-RNAW].
34. Citron & Franks, supra note 33, at 47; see Kashmir Hill, A Vast Web of Vengeance, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/30/technology/change-my-google-results.html [https://perma.cc/2HXJ-54FJ].
35. Brown, supra note 33.
36. There are some, however. See Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better Than the First
Amendment, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. REFLECTION 33 (2019).
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increasing number of commentators have joined policymakers in suggesting new ways to interpret, if not revise, the law.37
This Article joins the fray, though in a focused fashion. The Article does not propose repealing Section 230(c), nor does it highlight the
law’s most politically charged criticisms. Instead, the Article considers cases that have flown under the radar, including some that have
engendered frustratingly inconsistent decisions.38 In these cases,
judges encounter situations where a defendant’s own conduct is at
play—activity apart from republishing others’ content. Although this
would seem to take such claims outside Section 230(c)’s purview,
some courts continue to apply immunity nonetheless, elevating concerns about chilling online activity above all else. The Article takes
issue with those decisions, noting their inconsistency with analogous
principles of secondary liability and expressing skepticism that this
degree of protection is appropriate to serve the statute’s policy of encouraging activity on the internet.39 The Article also does a bit more.
Acknowledging the strong pull of the law’s original purpose, the Article suggests ways for courts to better balance interests.40 In particular, the Article draws parallels to well-established defamation law
principles that balance plaintiffs’ ability to protect reputational interests against concerns that imposing liability might chill speech.41
In the end, Section 230(c)’s twenty-six words changed the internet, but they will not be the final word on how the judicial systems
handles online activity. Hopefully, this Article will be part of the conversation about what comes next.
II. SECTION 230(C) AND THE BREADTH OF IMMUNITY
A. Underlying Policy
As noted above, Stratton Oakmont provided the impetus for Section 230(c).42 The case involved a message board hosted by Prodigy,

37. See, e.g., Citron & Franks, supra note 33; Volpe, supra note 19; Danielle Keats Citron &
Benjamin Wittes, The Problem Isn’t Just Backpage: Revising Section 230 Immunity, 2 GEO. L.
TECH. REV. 453 (2018); Annemarie Bridy, Remediating Social Media: A Layer-Conscious Approach, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 193 (2018); Citron & Wittes, supra note 6.
38. See infra Part III.
39. See infra Section II.C.
40. See infra Part IV.
41. See infra Part IV.
42. See supra notes 5–7, 15 and accompanying text.
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an early internet service provider.43 An anonymous poster on that
board accused Stratton Oakmont, a brokerage firm, of fraudulent activity.44 Stratton Oakmont sued for libel, seeking to hold Prodigy responsible as the accusation’s publisher45 in line with the doctrine that
makes traditional media responsible for disseminating third-party
statements. The court accepted Stratton Oakmont’s argument, noting
that Prodigy, having exercised editorial control in its forums and
screening for offensive language, was not a passive conduit of information.46 Ironically, this made Prodigy liable for trying to moderate
content (albeit unsuccessfully) when it would have been immune had
it done nothing at all.47
Proponents of what became Section 230(c) wanted to overturn
Stratton Oakmont48—and more.49 They hoped the new law would
serve not only to prevent a chilling effect on speech, but also cultivate
a favorable environment for internet commerce more broadly.50 Ultimately, subsection (b) of Section 230 set out this policy quite clearly:
43. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 031063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *1
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
44. Id. at *1.
45. If the court had determined that Prodigy was a distributor, rather than a publisher, it would
not have been liable for harm caused by the third-party poster. See id. at *3 (“[D]istributors such
as book stores and libraries may be liable for defamatory statements of others only if they knew or
had reason to know of the defamatory statement at issue. A distributor, or deliverer of defamatory
material is considered a passive conduit and will not be found liable in the absence of fault.” (citations omitted)).
46. Id. at *6.
47. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 6, at 405 (“The coup de grâce was that Prodigy lost its
protection as a distributor and gained liability as a publisher because it had tried to remove objectionable material but had done so incompletely.”). The Stratton-Oakmont court distinguished an
earlier federal court decision, Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991),
where the court concluded that an Internet service provider that did not exercise editorial control
over postings was akin to a distributor under traditional standards. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL
323710, at *4 (discussing Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 139–40).
48. “One of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy
and any other similar decisions which have treated such providers . . . as publishers or speakers of
content that is not their own because they have restricted access to objectionable material.” H.R.
REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10 (Leg. Hist.).
49. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 37, at 457.
50. Kosseff notes that, while Section 230 was a direct response to Stratton Oakmont, “there
was another reason that Cox and Wyden provided such sweeping immunity. They both recognized
that the Internet had the potential to create a new industry. Section 230, they hoped, would allow
technology companies to freely innovate and create open platforms for user content. Shielding Internet companies from regulation and lawsuits would encourage investments and growth . . . .”
KOSSEFF, supra note 1, at 2–3; see also Madeline Byrd & Katherine J. Strandburg, CDA 230 for a
Smart Internet, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 405, 407 (2019) (“Traditional publisher-style screening for
actionable content would have been untenable for online services that provided forums for userdriven exchanges involving large amounts of rapidly changing content. Congress also anticipated
that, if relieved of liability, online service providers would develop innovative technological ‘fixes’
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It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet
and other interactive computer services and other interactive
media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which
maximize user control over what information is received by
individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and
other interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower
parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or
inappropriate online material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal
laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking,
and harassment by means of computer.51
From the beginning, courts put great weight on Section 230’s policy statements.52 Indeed, courts have reached “near-universal” agreement that they must interpret the statute broadly, building a “mighty
fortress protecting platforms from any accountability for unlawful activity on their systems.”53 This includes protecting platforms that have
abetted indisputably bad actors.54 For example, courts have applied
Section 230(c) immunity in civil actions against websites that facilitate child trafficking.55 They have insulated social media companies
that failed to implement measures to protect teenagers from sexual
predators.56 They have extended immunity to operators of sites used
to the content-screening problem.”); Julio Sharp-Wasserman, Note, Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act and the Common Law of Defamation: A Convergence Thesis, 20 COLUM.
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 195, 203 (2018) (explaining that Section 230(c) was passed to protect freedom of speech on the Internet, remove disincentives to voluntary private censorship, and encourage
the development of Internet commerce generally).
51. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2018).
52. The statute does exclude certain areas, specifically stating that it has “no effect” on a variety of other laws, including those relating to intellectual property and criminal sex trafficking. Id.
§ 230(e).
53. Citron & Wittes, supra note 37, at 458.
54. Id. at 455.
55. See Doe ex rel. Roe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 104 F. Supp. 3d 149 (D. Mass. 2015), aff’d
sub nom. Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016).
56. See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008).
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by terrorists to organize attacks.57 One could go on, but in short, the
result is immunity that some view as “far more sweeping than anything the law’s words, context, and history support,”58 primarily in the
name of preventing the chilling of activity online.
B. An Example: Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com
To better understand this dynamic, consider Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com,59 a well-known Ninth Circuit decision from
2008. Roommates provides a good jumping off point because it includes vigorous majority and dissenting opinions that display the tension between addressing harmful conduct on the internet and a fear
that doing so might chill online activity, in conflict with Section 230’s
goals.
In Roommates, the defendant operated an online marketplace for
individuals seeking living arrangements.60 The site required subscribers to create profiles, disclosing information about their gender, sexual
orientation, and number of children in their households.61 The defendant guided input of this information by providing a drop-down menu
directing users to select these demographic criteria.62 The plaintiffs63
sued, alleging that the defendant’s system violated the Fair Housing
Act64 (FHA). A district court judge granted the plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment, concluding that the defendant ran afoul of the
FHA by prompting subscribers to enter unlawful preferences,65 publishing those preferences, and then matching users based on their

57. See Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 3d 964 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Force v. Facebook, Inc.,
934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2761 (2020).
58. Citron & Wittes, supra note 6, at 408; see KOSSEFF, supra note 1, at 65 (“[The] immunity
created a new legal landscape for online services . . . . If courts were to adopt a broad reading of
[Section 230(c)], the bill would create immunity that is far more expansive than the First Amendment protection for distributors under Smith v. California.”).
59. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th
Cir. 2008).
60. Id. at 1161.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1165.
63. The plaintiffs in the case were the Fair Housing Councils of San Fernando Valley and the
city of San Diego. Id. at 1161–62.
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2018); see Byrd & Strandburg, supra note 50, at 415–16 (“Discriminatory housing advertising claims are generally evaluated based on whether an ‘ordinary
reader’ of the ad would have perceived an unlawful ‘preference, limitation, or discrimination.’”).
65. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164. The FHA prohibits housing discrimination on the basis
of “race, color, sex, familial status, or national origin” in the rental or sale of any dwelling. 42
U.S.C. § 3604(a).

(6) 55.3_AKLEIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

656

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

7/23/22 11:47 AM

[Vol. 55:645

answers. The defendant appealed to the Ninth Circuit, asserting Section 230(c) immunity.66
Writing for the court’s majority, Judge Alex Kozinski rejected
immunity on grounds that the plaintiffs’ claim focused on the defendant’s own conduct rather than just re-publication of subscriber content.
Kozinski reasoned: “The CDA does not grant immunity for inducing
third parties to express illegal preferences. Roommate’s own acts—
posting the questionnaire and requiring answers to it—are entirely its
doing and thus section 230 of the CDA does not apply to them. Roommate is entitled to no immunity.”67
In other words, the defendant did more than passively transmit
information. By directing subscribers to the preset drop-down menus,
the defendant helped develop their profiles,68 thereby becoming a
“content provider” every bit as much as subscribers.69 Despite this
conclusion, Judge Kozinski was not hostile to Section 230’s purposes.
Indeed, toward the end of the opinion, he suggested that its breadth
was quite limited. “Websites are complicated enterprises,” he wrote,
“and there will always be close cases where a clever lawyer could argue that something the website operator did encouraged the illegality.
Such close cases, we believe, must be resolved in favor of immunity,
lest we cut the heart out of section 230 by forcing websites to face
death by ten thousand duck-bites . . . .”70

66. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162.
67. Id. at 1165 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 1166 (“When a business enterprise extracts such information from potential customers as a condition of accepting them as clients, it is no stretch to say that the enterprise is responsible, at least in part, for developing that information.”). The court clarified a previous ruling in
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which involved a user impersonating a celebrity on an online dating site. The Carafano court suggested that a site operator
could never be liable for a profile consisting of information obtained from a third party. Id. at 1124.
The Roommates court stepped back from that broad assertion: “[E]ven if the data are supplied by
third parties, a website operator may still contribute to the content’s illegality and thus be liable as
a developer. Providing immunity every time a website uses data initially obtained from third parties
would eviscerate the exception to section 230 for ‘develop[ing]’ unlawful content ‘in whole or in
part.’” Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d at 1171 (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
69. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d at 1167. The court reached the same conclusion regarding
the site’s search system, which sent messages to subscribers according to unlawfully discriminatory
criteria. Id. (“If such screening is prohibited when practiced in person or by telephone, we see no
reason why Congress would have wanted to make it lawful to profit from it online.”). It drew the
line only when addressing the site’s “additional comments” section, noting that, there, information
came entirely from subscribers and was displayed passively by the defendant. Id. at 1173–74; see
id. at 1175 (“The message to website operators is clear: If you don’t encourage illegal content, or
design your website to require users to input illegal content, you will be immune.”).
70. Id. at 1174.
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The majority’s opinion drew a strong dissent from Judge Margaret McKeown, who described it as “an unprecedented expansion of
liability” that “threaten[ed] to chill the robust development of the Internet.”71 Judge McKeown reviewed the language of Section 230(c),
agreeing with Judge Kozinski that the defendant could not claim immunity if it was an “information content provider” on its own.72 But
Judge McKeown did not focus on whether the defendant’s own actions
materially contributed to potentially unlawful activity. Rather, she
rested her opinion squarely on the law’s purpose—shielding Internet
service providers from liability for activity that transmits third-party
content in any way.73 In Judge McKeown’s view, that included the
defendant’s encouragement and solicitation of subscribers in this
case.74
The consequences of the majority’s interpretation are farreaching. Its position will chill speech on the Internet and impede “the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media.”
§ 230(b)(1). . . . Putting a lid on the sorting and searching
functions of interactive websites stifles the core of their services. . . . Were the websites to face host liability for this content, they “would have no choice but to severely limit its use”
and “[s]heer economics would dictate that vast quantities of
valuable information be eliminated from websites.”75
One might respond—yes and no. The statute’s drafters clearly
wanted to encourage internet activity.76 But nothing suggests that Congress meant immunity to be absolute, and Judge McKeown’s dissent
avoids engaging the majority’s statement about limiting the holding’s
scope to serve the general goal. Looking back at the opinion with the
71. Id. at 1176 (McKeown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. Id. at 1180. This, in turn, would require the court to treat it as a “publisher” under the terms
of Section 230(c).
73. Id. at 1177 (“[T]he CDA unambiguously demonstrate[s] that Congress intended these activities—the collection, organizing, analyzing, searching, and transmitting of third-party content—
to be beyond the scope of traditional publisher liability.”).
74. Id. at 1185 (“Even if Roommate’s prompts and drop-down menus could be construed to
seek out, or encourage, information from users, the CDA does not withhold immunity for the encouragement or solicitation of information.”).
75. Id. at 1188 (alteration in original) (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae News Organizations in
Support of Roommate.com, LLC at 22, Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (Nos. 04-56916, 04-57173)); see also id. at 1187
(“I am troubled by the consequences that the majority’s conclusion poses for the ever-expanding
Internet community.”).
76. Id. at 1179.
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benefit of time, the dissent’s approach raises at least two underlying
concerns. First, it diverges from approaches in analogous situations
involving derivative liability.77 Second, its primary justification for the
divergence (stifling online activity) has not come to pass. Indeed, the
internet industry is more robust than ever, raising questions about the
need to push the limits of immunity. The following section addresses
both points. It then moves to a discussion of two examples demonstrating how the tension remains in play today.
C. A Problem: Linking Conduct and Policy
1. Secondary Liability
In a recent law review article, Madeline Byrd and Katherine J.
Strandburg analyzed Section 230(c) in the context of smart services
that employ personalized data-driven models of user behavior.78 Byrd
and Strandburg focused on a narrow range of activities, notably Facebook’s online ad-targeting efforts.79 Their discussion, however, suggests an analogy that provides a useful template for examining a
broader set of fact patterns, including those that involve third-party
content on Internet sites.80 In particular, Byrd and Strandburg draw
parallels to the concept of secondary liability, an intellectual property
law principle that “aims to enlist the assistance of large, institutionalized, deep-pocketed players in enforcing laws when enforcement
against those who are directly liable is ineffective or costly.”81
77. Byrd & Strandburg, supra note 50, at 434–35.
78. Id. at 405–06.
79. Id. at 406.
80. As noted, Byrd and Strandburg draw this parallel from online copyright infringement cases
that raise similar policy issues to Section 230(c) cases. See id. at 429 n.141 (“[T]he immunity
framework provided by CDA 230 has been referenced in the context of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) and the issues with a safe harbor approach to internet service provider
(ISP) copyright immunity given the state of the modern internet.” (citing Katherine Burkhart, Note,
Mavrix v. LiveJournal: Unsafe Harbors in the Age of Social Media, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1015,
1029–33 (2018))); Michal Lavi, Evil Nudges, 21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 71–75 (2018).
81. Byrd & Strandburg, supra note 50, at 429. As Byrd and Strandburg acknowledge, framing
a discussion about Section 230(c) immunity through the lens of intellectual property law and secondary liability is not common. But they make a strong case that it is useful to do so. Looking back
to Section 230’s inception, Byrd and Strandburg note that the statute’s drafters had defamation law
as a “mental model” and, from that perspective, one might view publisher liability as direct. But
Byrd and Strandburg suggest that the typical paradigm of a case involving Section 230(c) involves
what is “effectively a form of secondary liability premised on actionable third-party content.” Id.
at 430 (emphasis added). Add the fact that ISPs today engage in a range of activities that the statute’s drafters never envisioned, and one is left with a problematic result. In many situations, “the
statute now often immunizes [ISPs] from liability for their own directly actionable conduct.” Id. at
433 (emphasis added). As this Article contends, that makes the secondary liability analogy a useful
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Viewing Internet companies as akin to “institutionalized players” and
site users as those who might be “directly liable,” one can organize the
concept in four different categories82:
(1) . . . “[M]onitor and control” liability, exemplified by vicarious liability for those with a right, ability, or duty to control the actions of those directly liable; (2) notice-based liability; (3) liability for inducement of a third party’s
actionable conduct; and (4) contributory liability based on facilitating or contributing to actionable conduct.83
The Roommates fact pattern, for example, fits neatly into the
fourth category, with the defendant facilitating and contributing to
user activity that potentially violated the FHA.84 This has a strong analogue in copyright infringement cases where contributory liability
turns on proof that a defendant’s technology “materially contributed”
to another’s unlawful infringement.85
Byrd and Strandburg acknowledge the importance of heeding the
statute’s language in drawing this analogy.86 In other words, courts
still must be mindful of whether the imposition of liability treats defendants as “publishers” or “speakers.”87 But, more often than not,
courts confronting the issue do not dwell on the statutory language and
focus instead on broader concerns.88 In other words, these courts
part of an argument that courts should reconsider Section 230(c)’s reach where plaintiffs seek to
impose liability on ISPs for their own activity.
82. Id. at 429.
83. Id.
84. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1167–68 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e interpret the [statutory] term ‘development’ as referring not merely
to augmenting the content generally, but to materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness. In
other words, a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to
section 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.” (emphasis added));
see also Byrd & Strandburg, supra note 50, at 434 (“Roommates.com essentially shoehorned a
contributory liability approach into the information content provider definition. The case interpreted ‘responsibility’ for developing online information in terms of whether the website’s design
‘materially contributed’ to its users’ discriminatory advertising or was a ‘neutral tool.’ This test is,
of course, familiar from contributory liability.” (footnotes omitted)). Others have described the majority’s approach as “conditional liability.” See Volpe, supra note 10, at 609–10 (“This approach
gives interactive computer services broad immunity for torts related to third party content, but conditions that immunity on ‘minimal responsibilities implicit in Section 230.’”).
85. See Byrd & Strandburg, supra note 50, at 432.
86. Id. at 434 (“The awkwardness derives not only from the fact that the definition focuses on
content but also from its statutory role in defining when defendants are directly liable.”).
87. See infra notes 106–111 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Lavi, supra note 80, at 40 n.282 (citing Varty Defterderian, Note, Fair Housing
Council v. Roommates.com: A New Path for Section 230 Immunity, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 563,
592 (2009); Jeff Kosseff, The Gradual Erosion of the Law That Shaped the Internet: Section 230’s
Evolution over Two Decades, 18 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 37 (2016); Seth Stern, Note,
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worry that if “institutionalized defendants” (like Roommates) face
more litigation risk, they might overcorrect,89 hence chilling desired
activity.
2. Chilling
Commentators have discussed the chilling concern at some
length.90 Though hard to quantify, the threat seems more theoretical
than real. Even at the time of Roommates, one could question how
much the threat of liability impacted online activity.91 Today, it is difficult to find examples of companies seriously arguing that they have
altered behavior because of potential litigation.92 Perhaps this is just
Section 230(c) at work. In other words, maybe the very reason that
activity is robust is because courts have applied immunity so broadly.
More likely, however, the threat of litigation simply is not stifling innovation to any significant extent.93
Think about today’s online landscape compared to when Congress enacted Section 230. In 1996, approximately seventy-seven
Fair Housing and Online Free Speech Collide in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com, LLC, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 559, 586–87 (2009)); see also Anthony Ciolli, Chilling
Effects: The Communications Decency Act and the Online Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIA. L.
REV. 137, 137–38 (2008) (discussing Section 230’s goal of preserving the internet’s expansion of
the marketplace of ideas).
89. Byrd & Strandburg, supra note 50, at 429 (“When the boundaries between legal and illegal
underlying behavior are not bright, there is often fear that secondary liability defendants, who may
have more to lose and more litigation risk than direct liability defendants, will overcompensate.”
(footnote omitted)).
90. See, e.g., Matt C. Sanchez, The Web Difference: A Legal and Normative Rationale Against
Liability for Online Reproduction of Third-Party Defamatory Content, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 301,
312 (2008); Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293, 300 (2011).
91. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1175 n.39 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Internet has outgrown its swaddling clothes and no longer needs
to be so gently coddled.”); see Citron & Wittes, supra note 6, at 411.
92. Certainly, tech executives do raise the specter of potential liability chilling activity online.
See Katie Canales, Mark Zuckerberg and Jack Dorsey Warn That Stripping Tech Firms of Section
230 Protections Would Harm Free Expression on the Internet, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 27, 2020, 1:19
PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/zuckerberg-dorsey-section-230-could-harm-internet-freespeech-2020-10 [https://perma.cc/5V57-5SXX] (linking to Congressional testimony from Mr.
Zuckerberg and Mr. Dorsey).
93. See Volpe, supra note 19, at 619 (“[T]ech innovation and the free market on the internet
are arguably no longer in danger of being stifled in their incipiency.”); see also Andrew Bolson,
The Internet Has Grown Up, Why Hasn’t the Law? Reexamining Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, IAPP (Aug. 27, 2013), https://iapp.org/news/a/the-internet-has-grown-up-whyhasnt-the-law-reexamining-section-230-of-the/ [https://perma.cc/HRW6-UY6N] (“[T]he Internet
has evolved in ways never first imagined. Although it is possible that Section 230 assisted in the
Internet’s growth and development, it seems that the Internet no longer needs to be coddled in order
to thrive.”).
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million internet users could visit about a quarter million websites. Today, the number of users and websites is in the billions.94 Companies
like Facebook, Twitter, and Google (which was not even incorporated
when Congress enacted Section 23095) are among the world’s wealthiest and most powerful companies, easily able to answer allegations of
wrongdoing without needing to trim back activities.96 Even with
smaller entities, one strains to find a credible argument that cases like
Roommates have stymied innovation. A recent United States Department of Justice report emphasized this point while recommending that
Congress pare back Section 230(c)’s protections.97 Though the media
covered this report through the lens of late 2020’s political acrimony,98
the report itself linked back to an earlier panel discussion of leading
academics and practitioners99 all of whom agreed that the nature of
today’s Internet industry calls into question at least some assumptions
that led to the law’s passage. The report states:
Since the enactment of Section 230 almost 25 years ago, the
internet and social media ecosystems have grown exponentially. So too have the leading internet and social media companies, which today are some of the most valuable American
enterprises. The transformation of a few start-up internet
companies into vast transnational enterprises, boasting
94. See Andrew P. Bolson, Flawed but Fixable: Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act at 20, 42 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2016) (citing Total Number of Websites,
INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/total-number-of-websites/ [https://perma.
cc/4XGB-7L4E]).
95. See id. at 24–25.
96. See Samuel Estreicher & Samantha Zipper, Another Strike Against § 230 of the Communications Decency Act: Courts Allowing § 230 to Trump Federal and State Public Accommodations
Protections, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Dec. 29, 2020), https://verdict.justia.com/2020/12/29/another-strik
e-against-§-230-of-the-communications-decency-act [https://perma.cc/AT9N-PBLW] (“Since its
inception, the internet industry has grown exponentially, leaving companies like Facebook, Twitter,
Twitch, and more with immense power and wealth. Thus, the liability protections that were once
thought necessary in 1996, would seem no longer essential to allow for growth in this sector.”);
infra note 100.
97. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 31.
98. See Brent Kendall & John D. McKinnon, Justice Department Proposes Limiting Internet
Companies’ Protections, WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2020, 5:01 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-to-propose-limiting-internet-firms-protections-11592391602 [https://perma.cc/U8
SD-ZLZS]; Cecilia Kang, Justice Dept. Urges Rolling Back Legal Shield for Tech Companies, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/technology/justice-dept-urges-rolli
ng-back-legal-shield-for-tech-companies.html [https://perma.cc/R2Y4-PDL7].
99. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 31, at 7 (linking to Section 230 Workshop—Nurturing
Innovation or Fostering Unaccountability?, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.jus
tice.gov/opa/video/section-230-workshop-nurturing-innovation-or-fostering-unaccountability [htt
ps://perma.cc/K5DU-N2LP]).
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annual revenues exceeding that of many countries, has raised
valid questions of whether those large tech companies still
require the blanket immunity Section 230 provided to the
nascent internet industry. While it may be imprudent to repeal the immunity entirely, it seems clear that tailored
changes to immunity to make the internet a safer place would
not unduly burden large tech companies.100
This is not to say that Section 230(c) was ill-conceived. Indeed,
governments have granted protections to so-called “infant industries”
for hundreds of years.101 But protections that policymakers deem necessary during an industry’s infancy need not stay in place forever. As
Professors Danielle Keats Citron and Benjamin Wittes noted, “[t]he
nature of the litigation protection that is essential in the early life of an
industry is very different from the proper protection given to a mature
one.”102 The automobile industry, for example, received protection
from product liability suits into the 1960s. But as the industry continued to strengthen and innovate, cars became safer and the need for
protection weakened.103 The same pattern applies here. The internet
industry has grown stronger, innovated, and developed greater mechanisms for protecting against abusive or harmful practices online.104
At the very least, courts should focus application of Section 230(c)’s
protections only on what is truly user-generated content. Citron and
Wittes explain:
Had Congress intended to extend a broad cloak of immunity
to providers beyond decisions related to the publication of
content, one would expect it to have said so. Congress did
100. Id. at 11.
101. See Infant Industry Argument, CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/economics/infant-industry-argument/ [https://perma.cc/MM67-VEVZ] (discussing the theory in the context of international trade). One counterargument to the infant industry
theory is that it might be politically difficult to remove protections after they are granted. Id. In this
regard, Section 230(c) seems to be case in point.
102. Citron & Wittes, supra note 6, at 422.
103. Id.
104. Indeed, the entire nature and pace of online communication is different than what existed
in the 1990s. See Nicole Phe, Note, Social Media Terror: Reevaluating Intermediary Liability Under the Communications Decency Act, 51 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 99, 124 (2018) (“When Congress
enacted § 230 in 1996, it operated under the belief that the Internet was meant to facilitate the free
exchange of words and ideas online, and as such, should be minimally regulated. Nevertheless,
twenty years have passed since Congress enacted § 230, and the Internet has evolved into something entirely different. Today, the Internet ‘facilitates almost instant communications,’ and users
can easily share or distribute potentially limitless information to a large audience, uninhibited by
geographical boundaries.” (footnotes omitted)).
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not even prohibit holding providers liable for the dissemination of information; it merely prohibited a finding that a provider was a “publisher” or “speaker.” Courts should, at a
minimum, limit the statute to those terms.105
III. INCONSISTENT APPLICATIONS
Perhaps one reason that courts have resisted limiting the statute’s
application is because Congress did not define the terms “publisher”
and “speaker.”106 Early on, courts tended to employ Section 230(c)’s
language as if it referenced the conventional distinction between publishers and distributors in defamation law.107 Under that distinction,
courts would treat internet companies as mere “distributors,” in line
with bookstores and newsstands that do not face liability unless they
knowingly distribute defamatory material.108 By contrast, courts
would shield internet companies from treatment akin to traditional
print media, characterized as “publishers” and responsible under the
same standards as authors of pieces (i.e., “speakers”) in their outlets.109
Although a number of early cases suggested that Section 230(c) immunity covered activity in both categories,110 other courts identified at
least some conduct as definitively outside the section’s protection.111
Case law in this area, however, is not consistent, including some circumstances in which it strains credulity to view the alleged misconduct as “publishing” or “speaking.” This inconsistency could chill actors every bit as much as a standard that regularly permits liability.112
105. Citron & Wittes, supra note 37, at 468.
106. Some view the word “speaker” as superfluous, and judicial analysis, to the extent it exists,
focuses on the word “publisher.” Byrd & Strandburg, supra note 50, at 433 n.168 (“CDA 230’s
reference to a ‘publisher or speaker’ is redundant, since a ‘speaker’ of third-party content is also
generally a ‘publisher.’ The inclusion of ‘speaker’ seems to play no independent role.”).
107. Sharp-Wasserman, supra note 50, at 206–07.
108. See id.
109. Id.; see also Phe, supra note 104, at 103 (“Under common law, primary publishers were
held to the same standard of liability as original authors because they were in the best position to
monitor and control content, and as a result, could have easily avoided or mitigated the harm caused
by defamation. On the other hand, a distributor is liable for the distribution of a defamatory publication only if the distributor had actual or imputed knowledge of the defamation and failed to remove the defamatory post.” (footnote omitted)).
110. See Byrd & Strandburg, supra note 50, at 408 (citing Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d
327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997)); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49–50 (D.D.C. 1998).
111. Roommates itself is a good example with the majority clearly viewing the plaintiffs’ claims
as relating to the defendant’s own conduct and not simply third-party content on its site. Fair Hous.
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008);
see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
112. See Anthony D’Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5 n.11 (1983).
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The following section highlights two examples, both involving cases
where courts reached opposite conclusions on virtually identical facts.
A. The Snapchat Cases
Snap Inc. (“Snap”) is a social media company best known for its
mobile application, Snapchat, which allows users to create and post
digital content.113 One of Snapchat’s features is Speed Filter, which
allows users to share photos or videos of activities showing their reallife speed.114 The filter has gained particular popularity among young
people eager to demonstrate how fast they drive cars.115 Critics allege
that Snap rewards this behavior through social media recognition, encouraging “extreme and addictive behaviors.”116 Unsurprisingly, the
use of Speed Filter has led to tragedy, followed by lawsuits seeking to
hold Snap liable for the consequences.
Maynard v. Snapchat, Inc.,117 a 2018 Georgia Court of Appeals
decision, provides an example. In Maynard, the plaintiffs, a married
couple, were struck by a driver using the Speed Filter.118 A passenger
in the back seat of the car that the offending driver was operating while
using Snapchat described what happened just before the accident:
I looked in the front, and saw [the driver] holding her phone.
The screen had a speed on it, which was about 80 m.p.h. and
climbing. I asked . . . if her phone was keeping up with the
speed of the car. [She] said it was. I told her I was pregnant
and asked her to slow down. [She] responded and said she
was just trying to get the car to 100 m.p.h. to post it on Snapchat. She said “I’m about to post it.” I began pleading with
[her] to slow down. I saw the speed on the phone hit 113
m.p.h. before she let off the gas. Just after I saw the speed of
113 m.p.h., a car pulled out of an apartment complex, and I
screamed.119
113. Maynard v. Snapchat, Inc., 816 S.E.2d 77, 79 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (“Snapchat is an
application made for mobile devices that allows users to take temporary photos and videos, also
known as ‘Snaps,’ and share them with friends.”).
114. Speed Filter is one of a number of Snapchat filters. It is a virtual speedometer “that shows
the speed at which a user is moving and allows for that speed to be superimposed to a Snap before
sending it out over the application.” Id.; Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1105–06
(C.D. Cal. 2020), rev’d, 995 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2021).
115. Lemmon, 440 F. Supp. 3d at 1106.
116. Id.; see infra notes 134–135 and accompanying text.
117. 816 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
118. Id. at 78.
119. Id. at 79.
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As a result of the accident, the plaintiff’s baby suffered permanent
brain damage. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against both the driver and
Snap, alleging the company knew that Speed Filter encouraged excessive speeding of the type that led to the accident.120 Snap moved to
dismiss, asserting immunity under Section 230(c).121 A trial court
granted the motion.122 The Georgia Court of Appeals, however, reversed.123
In evaluating Snap’s argument, the court set out three elements
for immunity based on the statute’s language.124 First, the defendant
must be a “provider or user of an interactive computer service.”125 Second, the claim must seek to treat the defendant as a “publisher or
speaker” of information.126 Third, a third-party must have provided the
information at issue.127 The Maynard court acknowledged that Section
230(c) is “robust,” with all doubt being resolved in favor of immunity,128 yet concluded that this was not a situation where the protection
applied.129 The court stated they did not address the issue of whether
Snap was an interactive computer service as “the parties do not address
the issue . . . and appear to agree that it is.” However, the court refused
to characterize the plaintiff’s theory as treating Snap like a publisher
or speaker of third-party content.130 Instead, the court found that the
plaintiff sought “to hold Snapchat liable for its own conduct,” principally creating Speed Filter and failing to adequately warn about the
dangers of its use.131
The decision in Maynard makes eminent sense. As in Roommates, and consistent with analogous principles of secondary liability,132 the allegations against Snapchat were for “facilitating or contributing” to actionable conduct.133 One also might describe plaintiff’s
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 82.
124. Id. at 80.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 79.
130. Id. at 81.
131. Id. (emphasis added). The court noted that the driver failed to actually post on Snapchat
before the accident occurred. Id. at 80. But it did not suggest that immunity would have applied had
the driver been able to hit the button before the crash.
132. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
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claim as alleging that Snap “induced” the driver’s dangerous driving
through the lure of rewards and recognition.134 Either way, the claim
focused on Snap’s own behavior. It did not seek to impose liability for
the consequences of republishing third party content, the statutory
hallmark of Section 230(c) immunity.135 In addition, despite Snap’s
argument that users can deploy Speed Filter for benign activities,136
little doubt exists that the feature lures young drivers into risky behavior. Indeed, a recent academic study in Australia found that “of all the
different types of social media use while driving (e.g., Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram), the use of Snapchat was clearly the most common, and almost the only, type of social media use while driving that
was mentioned among participants.”137 A key reason is “to use the
Snapchat speed filter, to send a video or photo of themselves while
driving” and to succeed in keeping up with incentives, such as maintaining posting “streaks” on the platform.138
A consistent set of rulings like Maynard might cause Snap to
think twice about Speed Filter and, in turn, save lives.139 Consistency,
however, is not a trait of Section 230(c) jurisprudence, and at least one
court subsequently concluded that Section 230(c) should protect Snap
from liability. The case is Lemmon v. Snap, Inc.,140 a 2020 opinion
from the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.
In Lemmon, the driver was a seventeen year-old boy who used
Speed Filter to capture his car’s speed of 123 miles per hour shortly
134. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
136. Snap warns people not to “Snap and drive” and maintains that users can utilize the filter
to show the speed at which they, say, run or bike. See AJ Dellinger, Snapchat’s Speed Filter Is at
the Center of This Distracted Driving Lawsuit, DAILY DOT (May 26, 2021, 8:14 PM),
https://www.dailydot.com/debug/snapchat-distracted-driving-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/M79L-K6
YS].
137. Verity Truelove et al., “I Snapchat and Drive!” A Mixed Methods Approach Examining
Snapchat Use While Driving and Deterrent Perceptions Among Young Adults, 131 ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION 146, 149 (2019).
138. Id. at 153.
139. As discussed later in this section, it is hard to imagine that a threat to this narrow aspect of
its operation would prevent Snap from maintaining a larger presence online or would deter other
companies from competing in the same space. The situation today is much different than it was in
1996, and Section 230(c) immunity no longer protects a fragile ecosystem of Internet pioneers.
Snap is a multi-billion-dollar business with millions of users worldwide interacting with its service
in a myriad of ways. Snap, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 4, 2022).
140. 440 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2020), rev’d, 995 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2021). The opinion
was very recently overturned by the Ninth Circuit, but the lower court decision remains a useful
counterpoint for purposes of this discussion. It also exemplifies the possibility (perhaps a likelihood) of inconsistency in judicial application of Section 230 immunity, even in situations with
nearly identical facts. See infra notes 117–118.
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before crashing into a tree, killing himself and two passengers.141 The
passengers’ parents sued Snap, alleging that its creation and maintenance of Speed Filter caused the accident.142 Snap moved to dismiss,
arguing that Section 230(c) barred the claim.143 The Lemmon court
began its analysis by reviewing Section 230(c)’s three-part test for immunity144 and, like the Maynard court, focused on whether the plaintiffs sought to impose liability on Snap for re-“publishing” another’s
content.145 The court initially looked to Roommates and whether Snap
materially contributed to harmful activity,146 but concluded that this
was not the case, accepting Snap’s argument that Speed Filter was a
“neutral tool, which can be utilized for both proper and improper purposes”147 and describing the plaintiff’s allegations as seeking to impose liability merely for “enhancement by implication or development
by inference.”148 The court called the case a “close scenario,” but concluded that in close situations, immunity should apply.149
The “close scenario” language is a reference to the Roommates
majority’s view that close cases should be resolved in favor of immunity.150 Roommates, however, hardly foreclosed the possibility of liability in appropriate situations.151 Indeed, the Lemmon court acknowledged that similar cases had declined to apply immunity, citing
specifically to Maynard.152 Yet the Lemmon court all but ignored the
Maynard court’s point that the allegations against Snap focused
clearly on its own conduct rather than on the content of the user’s posting.153 The Ninth Circuit very recently came to that exact conclusion,
141. Lemmon, 440 F. Supp. 3d at 1105.
142. Id. at 1103.
143. Id. at 1108.
144. Citing Ninth Circuit precedent, the court articulated the test as follows: “Immunity from
liability exists for ‘(1) provider or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks
to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by
another information content provider.’” Id. at 1108–09 (quoting Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d
1096, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2009)); see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
145. Lemmon, 440 F. Supp. 3d at 1109.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1111; see supra note 136.
148. Lemmon, 440 F. Supp 3d at 1112–13 (quoting Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley
v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174–75 (9th Cir. 2008)).
149. Id. at 1113. The court noted its inconsistency with Maynard, explaining it based on the
Maynard court not examining Ninth Circuit case law relating to “neutral tools.” Id.
150. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
152. See Lemmon, 440 F. Supp. 3d at 1113.
153. Maynard v. Snapchat, Inc., 816 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). Using the language of
secondary liability discussed above, the claims against Snap in Lemmon relate to facilitating,
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reversing the district court’s ruling154 and holding that the “case presents a clear example of a claim that simply does not rest on thirdparty content.”155
Despite the Ninth Circuit’s reversal, the district court opinion in
Lemmon remains a useful counterpoint for demonstrating the extent to
which some judges will go in applying Section 230(c) immunity, motivated by a desire to serve its goal of encouraging online activity—a
possibility that remains open in most jurisdictions. Equally important,
and beyond what the Ninth Circuit discussed in its opinion, nothing
suggests that the threat of liability has chilled Snap’s activity.156 At the
time of Maynard, Snap was only five years old, valued at $16 billion.157 Today, Snap’s value is estimated at close to $50 billion, with
the company generating around a billion dollars of revenue each quarter.158 The company boasts over 300 million daily users, including 65
percent of all U.S. internet users between the ages of 18 and 29.159
Unsurprisingly, Snap does not appear to even insinuate that defending
claims about Speed Filter would lead it to alter activity in any way.160
Apparently, the threat of liability has been nothing more than a “speed
bump” to the company’s continued profitable activity.
Perhaps one might argue that while this is true for social media
giants (and at this point, Snap surely qualifies), smaller website operators face different circumstances. The following section argues this
contributing, or even inducing dangerous activity every bit as much as in Maynard. The claims do
not focus on content posted by the drivers. Lemmon, 440 F. Supp. 3d at 1109.
154. Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 995 F.3d 1085, 1095 (9th Cir. 2021).
155. Id. at 1093. More specifically, the court characterized the plaintiff’s allegations about
Speed Filter as one of “negligent design—a common products liability tort.” Id. at 1092; see Gregory M. Dickinson, Rebooting Internet Immunity, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 375 (2021) (“What
[the Snapchat] cases show . . . is how poorly suited Section 230 is for analyzing product-liabilitytype claims involving virtual products.”).
156. See Bobby Allyn, Snapchat Ends ‘Speed Filter’ That Critics Say Encouraged Reckless
Driving, NPR (June 17, 2021, 11:58 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/06/17/1007385955/snapchatends-speed-filter-that-critics-say-encouraged-reckless-driving
[https://perma.cc/MJ4K-7SFF].
And, of course, it is this possibility that has been the fundamental underpinning of courts’ broad
application of Section 230(c) immunity.
157. See Jason Silverstein, Snapchat Speed Filter ‘Motivated’ Car Crash That Left Georgia
Man with Brain Damage, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 26, 2016, 5:25 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/snapchat-speed-filter-motivated-car-crash-suit-article-1.2615208.
158. Snap Inc. (SNAP) Valuation Measures & Financial Statistics, YAHOO! FIN. (Apr. 14,
2022), https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/SNAP/key-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/3K7T-M59J].
Snap has recently shown robust double-digit growth year-to-year. See Salman Aslam, Snapchat by
the Numbers: Stats, Demographics & Fun Facts, OMNICORE (Mar. 2, 2022), https://www.omnicoreagency.com/snapchat-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/7HXP-XFX2].
159. Aslam, supra note 158.
160. Allyn, supra note 156.
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is not true, providing an example of two contrasting cases involving a
site of a different nature.
B. The Ripoff Report Cases
Ripoff Report is a website that invites visitors to post consumer
complaints.161 Reminiscent of Roommates, the site requires users to
label posts with preset descriptors.162 In addition, Ripoff Report steers
subjects of complaints to a fee-based “corporate advocacy program”
through which it claims to restore reputations.163 Not surprisingly,
Ripoff Report’s business model has made it the target of litigation.164
Once again, however, courts have reached inconsistent conclusions in
evaluating claims. Two examples follow, beginning here with a case
in which Ripoff Report successfully raised Section 230(c) immunity,
and then drawing a contrast with a case that came out the other way.
The first case is Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures,
LLC,165 a 2008 decision from the U.S. District Court for the District
of Arizona. In Global Royalties, Spencer Sullivan posted a message
on Ripoff Report’s site referring to plaintiff’s business as a “scam,”
and placing his complaint in Ripoff Report’s preset “Con Artists” category.166 Under threat of legal action from the plaintiff, Sullivan
backed off his allegations in two subsequent posts.167 He also asked
the site’s operators to remove his complaints.168 Ripoff Report refused, leading to the plaintiff’s action seeking damages for harm to its
business.169 In response, Ripoff Report invoked Section 230(c), asserting that the plaintiff’s lawsuit sought to hold it liable as a speaker or
publisher of content provided solely by Sullivan.170 The plaintiff set
forth three counterarguments: first, that immunity should not apply
161. See Glob. Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 930 (D. Ariz.
2008). The site is located at https://www.ripoffreport.com.
162. See id. at 930.
163. Id. at 932–33; see KOSSEFF, supra note 1, at 125. According to critics, Ripoff Report essentially encourages “defamatory postings from others for their own financial gain.” Glob. Royalties, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 930, 932.
164. See KOSSEFF, supra note 1, at 122 (“No single defendant has been the subject of more
Section 230 court opinions than Ripoff Report.”).
165. 544 F. Supp. 2d 929 (D. Ariz. 2008).
166. Id. at 930.
167. Id. at 930–31.
168. Id. at 931.
169. Id. In fact, Ripoff Report maintains a blanket no-removal policy regardless of circumstances. See KOSSEFF, supra note 1, at 125–26 (“The site’s general no-removal policy applies even
if a consumer posts a review and then later asks Ripoff Report to delete the post.”).
170. See Glob. Royalties, Ltd., 544 F. Supp. 2d at 931.
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when the content’s author requests that it be removed;171 second, that
Ripoff Report itself is an information content provider with respect to
postings on its site;172 and third, that Ripoff Report coerced the subjects of complaints to pay for its “advocacy program.”173
The court, however, rejected each of the plaintiff’s arguments.174
With regard to Ripoff Report’s refusal to remove the initial post after
Sullivan’s request, the court worried that doing so might lead website
operators to remove postings any time someone purports to be the author of a post, whether true or not.175 With regard to Ripoff Report’s
steering of posters toward preset categories (such as “Con Artist”), the
court dismissed Ripoff Report’s role as “minor” and “insufficient” to
make the site operators content providers themselves.176 Finally, with
respect to the defendant’s use of its advocacy program, the court concluded that the tactic did not relate to soliciting or altering comments
about the plaintiff, leaving Ripoff Report’s involvement as “passive.”177 In the end, the court used sweeping language to reject the
plaintiff’s attempt to hold Ripoff Report responsible: “Unless Congress amends the statute, it is legally (although perhaps not ethically)
beside the point whether defendants refuse to remove the material, or
how they might use it to their advantage.”178 Perhaps not surprisingly,
that decision was expressly motivated by a desire to interpret immunity broadly, serving Congress’s goal “to encourage development of the
internet and prevent the threat of liability from stifling free expression.”179
Global Royalties suggests that Ripoff Report, a smaller entity
than Snap, is protected, able to go about its business without concern
that liability might impose costs and require the trimming of its sails.
But not all courts have seen it that way. Consider Vision Security, LLC
v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC,180 a 2015 decision from the U.S. District
171. Id.
172. Id. at 932.
173. Id.
174. Id. 932–33.
175. Id. at 932.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 933. Roommates was scheduled for its en banc hearing at the time of this decision.
Plaintiff sought to stay the action until the Ninth Circuit rendered its decision, but the court refused.
Id.
178. Id. The court’s decision was expressly motivated by a desire to interpret the immunity
broadly, serving Congress’s goal “to encourage development of the internet and to prevent the
threat of liability from stifling free expression.” Id. at 931.
179. Id. at 931.
180. No. 13-CV-00926, 2015 WL 12780892 (D. Utah Aug. 27, 2015).
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Court for the District of Utah that reached the exact opposite conclusion in a very similar claim against Ripoff Report.181
In Vision Security, the court described Ripoff Report’s operations
just as the Global Royalties court did.182 However, instead of characterizing Ripoff Report’s role as “minor” or “insufficient,” the court
viewed its alleged activities as significant enough to remove the case
from the purview of Section 230(c) altogether. The court noted that,
according to the complaint, the site encourages competitors, not just
consumers, to post negative content on the site.183 It emphasized
Ripoff Report’s refusal to remove content when an author conceded
falsity and asked the site operators to delete it.184 The court also highlighted the “corporate advocacy program” through which it sought
profit from the very content it encouraged and refused to remove.185
Unlike the Global Security court, the Vision Security court found that
the program made Ripoff Report much more than a “neutral conduit”186 of potentially damaging information.
[Ripoff Report] had an interest in, and encouraged, negative
content. It refused to remove the content, even when told by
the author that it was false and he wanted it removed. What
interest would a neutral publisher have in maintaining false
and harmful content against the wishes of the author unless
it advanced its own commercial interests?187
The court supported its conclusion with Tenth Circuit precedent stating that an internet service provider is not neutral if it “specifically
encourages development of what is offensive about the content.”188
The Tenth Circuit precedent, in turn, cited Roommates for the proposition that an internet service provider cannot avail itself of immunity
if it encourages offensive or illegal content.189
181. See id. at *3.
182. Id. at *2 –3. This case arose on the defendant’s motion to reconsider an earlier motion to
dismiss. Id. at *1.
183. Id. at *2. This would be contrary to the site’s own tagline of “By Consumers, for consumers.” See id.
184. Id. at *3.
185. Id. (“Indeed, it is reasonable to infer that the very raison d’etre for the website was to
commercialize on its ability to sell its program to counter the offensive content the Ripoff Report
encouraged.”).
186. See id. at *2–3.
187. Id. at *3.
188. Id. at *2 (citing and quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1199
(10th Cir. 2009)).
189. Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1198 (citing Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008)).
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Vision Security got it right. Similar to Snap in the situations discussed above,190 Ripoff Report actively facilitates and contributes to
actionable conduct, guiding users to characterizations of others’ conduct in a negative light. It induces competitors to post negative comments about other actors in an effort to drive business to its corporate
advocacy program.191 One could even make the case that allegations
against Ripoff Report involve “notice-based liability” given that both
decisions discussed above involve situations where users backed off
claims and requested that the site remove their posts.192
Not everyone agrees. Shortly after the Vision Security court rendered its opinion, Professor Eric Goldman criticized the outcome, calling the Tenth Circuit’s “neutral publisher” approach problematic and
expressing concern that a “neutrality”-based standard would become
a placeholder for other norms.193 But just as with Snap, the possibility
of liability does not seem to have deterred Ripoff Report in the least.
Jeff Kosseff pointed to some of the litigation against Ripoff Report
and then described his interview with the site’s founder, Ed Magedson: “Those who thought . . . threats would work have not spent much
time talking to Magedson [who] laughs as he recounts the countless
threats that he has received.”194 Similarly, the New York Times recently published an article that specifically referenced Ripoff Report’s
continued online presence, noting its easy accessibility and highlighting the damage it has done to those who are victims of falsehoods on
the site.195 And it is not just Ripoff Report. Despite uncertainty

190. See supra notes 132–135 and accompanying text.
191. Or at least this is what plaintiffs allege in complaints. Surely that should allow such claims
to survive motions to dismiss. See Vision Sec., 2015 WL 12780892, at *2–3.
192. Drawing similar parallels, Dr. Michal Lavi places Ripoff Report’s conduct in the “contributory liability” category based on its design of menus, filters, and tags that steer users to negative
options. See Lavi, supra note 80, at 82–84.
193. See Eric Goldman, Another Tough Section 230 Ruling for Ripoff Report—Vision Security
v. Xcentric, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Sept. 20, 2015), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/09/another-tough-section-230-ruling-for-ripoff-report-vision-security-v-xcentric.htm
[https://perma.cc/N6T5-QF2U] (“The court’s legal test of ‘neutral publisher’ is an oxymoron and
incoherent. By definition, no publisher is ever neutral. Instead, any legal standard dependent on
‘neutrality’ becomes a placeholder for other social norms.”).
194. KOSSEFF, supra note 1, at 126; see id. (“Ripoff Report attracts so many formal complaints
that it does not even maintain an official count of the number of lawsuits and litigation threats it
has received over the past two decades.”).
195. See Hill, supra note 34. As the article states:
[T]here is no fact-checking. The sites often charge money to take down posts, even defamatory ones. And there is limited accountability. Ripoff Report, like the others, notes
on its site that, thanks to Section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act, it
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regarding the interpretation of Section 230(c), another recent New
York Times article described a flourishing set of similar websites that
it characterized as a “slander industry.”196 Once again, it is hard to find
so much as a suggestion that potential liability is deterring this type of
activity online.
Even if one is inclined to view the proliferation of sites like Ripoff
Report as a positive thing, it is hard to view inconsistent precedent as
a recipe serving public policy goals. Certainly, it does not create an
environment that provides those harmed by online content a clear understanding of when they can (or cannot) seek compensation.197 Section 230(c) might have helped to “create the Internet” and encouraged
its growth.198 But times have changed, and our legal system’s interpretation of the statute should change with it.
C. Taking Stock
At this point, the Article has moved through a fair amount of material. This section takes stock of that coverage before moving forward
with a proposal. Beyond reviewing the basic structure of Section
230(c), the Article has concentrated on applications of the statute that
have flown a bit under the radar. Building on the better-known Roommates case, the Article focused on two fact patterns where courts
reached inconsistent conclusions in cases with virtually identical facts.
The allegations in both pairs of cases took aim at the defendants’ own
conduct,199 rather than content posted online by others, and the Article
was not shy in endorsing the opinions that refused to apply immunity.
As discussed above, these cases also fit comfortably into analogous
liability structures that permit secondary liability, whether one

isn’t responsible for what its users post. . . . With that impunity, Ripoff Report and its ilk
are willing to host pure, uncensored vengeance.
Id.
196. Aaron Krolik & Kashmir Hill, The Slander Industry, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/04/24/technology/online-slander-websites.html [https:/
/perma.cc/P8XN-WT6F].
197. Nor does the current state of the law do much, if anything, to deter harmful conduct. See
Citron & Franks, supra note 33, at 54 (“Section 230 has subsidized platforms whose business is
online abuse and the platforms who benefit from ignoring abuse. It is a classic ‘moral hazard,’
ensuring that tech companies never have to absorb the costs of their behavior.”); supra notes 195–
196 and accompanying text.
198. See KOSSEFF, supra note 1; Citron & Franks, supra note 33, at 54.
199. See supra notes 132–134, 190–192 and accompanying text.
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describes that as a defendant’s “contribution to,” “inducement of,” or
“notice of” potentially harmful conduct.200
The highlighted cases are good examples for discussion, but they
are not the only ones that pose these types of problems. There are
higher profile examples stemming from litigation against the operators
of websites such as Backpage.com201 and TheDirty.com202—again,
situations where judges struggle to apply Section 230(c) consistently,
even in cases with similar facts.203 The courts that hesitate to allow
claims express concern that doing so would conflict with the law’s
goal of encouraging activity online. Or, using the mirror term, they
fear that imposing liability would chill activity on the Internet.204 Theoretically, this is rational. Basic economics suggest that potential tort

200. See supra notes 132–134, 190–192 and accompanying text.
201. Compare J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 359 P.3d 714, 717–18 (Wash. 2015)
(affirming a lower court decision denying Backpage’s motion to dismiss because the facts showed
that Backpage did more than just maintain neutral policies and was specifically designed to facilitate sex trafficking), with Doe ex rel. Roe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 104 F. Supp. 3d 149 (D. Mass.
2015), aff’d sub nom. Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016) (granting
motion to dismiss under similar circumstances).
202. Compare Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings, LLC, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1012 (E.D.
Ky. 2012) (finding that plaintiff’s claims were not barred by the CDA because defendants specifically encouraged the development of the offensive conduct), with S.C. v. Dirty World, LLC, No.
11-CV-00392, 2012 WL 3335284, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 2012) (finding that plaintiff’s claims
against the same defendants were barred by the CDA and that the argument that the website encouraged illegal conduct failed both legally and factually). However, the Sixth Circuit vacated the
judgment in favor of Jones and reversed the denial of defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter
of law, so the results are no longer conflicting. See Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755
F.3d 398, 417 (6th Cir. 2014).
203. Setting aside case law that conflicts on similar facts, courts have applied immunity in additional situations where plaintiffs clearly plead facts that seek to impose liability for a defendant’s
own conduct. See, e.g., Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d,
765 F. App’x 586 (2d Cir. 2019) (applying Section 230 immunity where a plaintiff alleged that a
dating app was defectively designed for lack of features to prevent impersonating profiles and other
dangerous conduct); Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., No. C-10-1321, 2011 WL 5079526, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 26, 2011), aff’d, 765 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying Section 230 immunity where a plaintiff alleged that Yelp unlawfully manipulated the content of business review pages to induce payment for advertising); see also Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019) (applying Section 230 immunity where a plaintiff alleged that Facebook, through its algorithms, provided
terrorist organizations with support to enable attacks), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2761 (2020). The
Force case drew a strong dissent. See id. at 76–77 (Katzmann, J., dissenting) (“[I]t strains the English language to say that in targeting and recommending these writings to users—and thereby forging connections, developing new social networks—Facebook is acting as ‘the publisher of . . . information provided by another information content provider.’” (omission in original)).
204. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1176 (9th Cir. 2008) (McKeown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The majority’s
unprecedented expansion of liability for Internet service providers threatens to chill the robust development of the Internet that Congress envisioned.”).
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liability deters activity,205 and the statute plainly identifies industry
protection as a Congressional goal.206 It is fair to infer that the Internet
might not have prospered in the same way absent Section 230(c)’s
protections. But it is difficult to see the dynamic having a significant
impact today.
In this environment, some commentators have called for the statute’s repeal, or at least significant revision.207 But if that does not happen, what next? Should courts simply continue to issue “all or nothing” rulings of the sort highlighted in this Article?208 Or is there a
better way to address claims under the law’s current terms, balancing
the competing goals of compensating those harmed by wrongful conduct and encouraging activity online?209 The following section attempts to do just that, drawing parallels to well-established tools utilized by courts that have long balanced competing interests in a
different context.
IV. AN ANALOGY: BALANCING INTERESTS AND THE BURDEN OF
PROOF
This section of the Article proposes that courts interpret Section
230 by balancing competing interests using rules similar to those in
defamation actions that implicate free speech concerns. Courts could
apply these concepts broadly, but this section focuses on the type of
situations identified above—that is, cases where plaintiffs plead that a
defendant’s own conduct contributed to harm by facilitating or inducing third-party action, or in failing to act based on clear notice of
wrongdoing.210 The proposal is designed to acknowledge Section
230’s goal of protecting the Internet industry211 while providing courts
with a safe harbor to permit liability in appropriate situations, nudging
205. See Wu, supra note 90, at 300 (“The problem with harnessing the power of intermediaries
by imposing liability on them is that the fear of liability may induce intermediaries to block or
eliminate too much content, including content that may be both lawful and socially desirable.”).
206. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 37 and accompanying text; Lavi, supra note 80, at 85 n.626.
208. See Byrd & Strandburg, supra note 50, at 434 (Section 230 “sets up an all-or-nothing
choice between ‘monitor and control’ liability and complete immunity.”)
209. See Lavi, supra note 80, at 86 (“[C]ourts—without legislative changes—can set the proper
boundaries of immunity. . . . According to a proper reading of section 230, intermediaries that
nudge speech . . . are ‘responsible’ at least ‘in part’ for creating or developing . . . content and
should not enjoy the immunity.”).
210. One might even view this as akin to a pleading requirement.
211. A goal that obviously would remain in place if Congress does not repeal or change the
statute.
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judges away from feeling compelled to essentially say, “this outcome
is wrong, but the immunity appears absolute.”212
To draw the analogy, one must start with the famous case of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.213 This is not the place for a lengthy recitation, but briefly, the case involved an advertisement in the March 29,
1960, edition of the New York Times that described the conduct of local and state officials in Montgomery, Alabama, during the era’s civil
rights struggle.214 The advertisement contained minor inaccuracies,215
and L.B. Sullivan, a Montgomery city commissioner, filed a defamation action against the newspaper claiming that the advertisement
harmed his personal reputation.216 A local jury found for Sullivan and
awarded him $500,000 in damages.217 The Alabama Supreme Court
affirmed,218 leading the Times to seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme
Court on grounds that the decision violated the First Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution.219
Until New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court
had never ruled that the First Amendment limited state defamation
law.220 Or, to put things in a frame that more closely connects with this
Article, the Court had never articulated a standard that might limit the
ability of plaintiffs to seek compensation for reputational harm in service of the First Amendment’s principle of free speech. In New York
212. The proposals in this section cannot guarantee doctrinal consistency, but they would help
the cause.
213. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
214. See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 5–7 (1991). The advertisement’s headline said, “Heed Their Rising Voices,” a phrase
that appeared in a Times editorial ten days earlier, including language that appeared in the ad: “The
growing movement of peaceful mass demonstrations by Negroes is something new in the South,
something understandable. . . . Let Congress heed their rising voices, for they will be heard.” Id. at
6 (omission in original). For a recent and interesting critique of Sullivan, see David A. Logan,
Rescuing Our Democracy by Rethinking New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 759
(2020).
215. The misstatements were quite minor. The ad stated that Black student leaders at Alabama
State College were expelled after singing “My Country, ‘Tis of Thee” on the Alabama state Capitol
steps. In reality, they were expelled because of a sit-down strike at a courthouse restaurant. LEWIS,
supra note 214, at 10. In addition, the ad included a misstatement that state officials had padlocked
students in their dining hall. Id. at 31. It also misstated the number of times that Martin Luther King,
Jr. had been arrested. Id.; see Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 259.
216. LEWIS, supra note 214, at 12, 28–31.
217. Id. at 33.
218. Id. at 44–45.
219. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 264.
220. See LEWIS, supra note 214, at 103 (“[L]ibel had always been entirely a matter of state law.
No award of damages for libel, however grotesque the sum or outlandish the legal theory underlying it, had ever been held to violate the First Amendment or any other provision of the Constitution.”).
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Times Co. v. Sullivan, however, the Court did just that, emphasizing
“the chilling effect of the Alabama libel laws on First Amendment
freedoms.”221 Of course, the Sullivan Court could have applied complete immunity, creating an absolute shield in the name of free
speech.222 But instead, the Court chose a more nuanced approach, raising the bar for public officials in a way that left the door open to liability but minimizing the chilling of speech.223
The Sullivan Court did this in two ways. First, and most famously,
it introduced a fault standard as part of the prima facie case. No longer
could a state allow a public official to succeed simply by demonstrating that a defendant made a false statement damaging to her reputation. Going forward, public officials needed to prove actual malice—
that the defendant knew a statement was false or that the defendant
had reckless disregard for the truth.224 Second, the Sullivan Court required that plaintiffs establish this level of knowledge with clear and
convincing clarity—a higher burden of proof than the preponderance
standard normally used in civil actions.225
Both mechanisms are court-created adjustments to common law
standards, designed to balance competing interests and give precedence to a societal policy goal at the expense of compensating some
plaintiffs who are genuinely harmed by actors engaging in the protected activity. In the defamation context, the policy interest is encouraging speech on matters of public concern (or its mirror image—preventing the chilling of speech on matters of public concern) at the
expense of compensating those whose reputations are damaged by
221. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 300 (Goldberg, J., concurring in the result). Later in the opinion, the
Court explained more broadly: “[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that . . . must
be protected [to support freedom of expression]. . . . ‘The interest of the public here outweighs the
interest of appellant or any other individual.’” Id. at 271–72 (majority opinion).
222. In concurrence, Justices Black and Douglas essentially advocated this approach, taking
the position that the First Amendment should provide absolute protection against speech that is
critical of public officials. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 293–97 (Black, J., concurring).
223. This, of course, is similar to what Congress did in enacting Section 230, raising the bar for
liability as a means to avoid chilling activity online.
224. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80 (“The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal
rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”). Three
years later, the Court extended this to cases brought by public figures, as well as public officials.
See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). In 1974, the Court extended this to private
plaintiffs suing for defamation on matters of public concern, requiring that those plaintiffs prove at
least negligence with respect to a defendant’s knowledge of truth or falsity. Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348–49 (1974).
225. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285–86.
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false and defamatory statements.226 If similar standards applied in internet cases, courts would give precedence to the societal (and statutory) goal of encouraging activity online (or its mirror image—preventing the chilling of such activity) at the expense of compensating
those who suffered harm due to activity online.227 Let’s briefly walk
through how this might work.
The analogy applies best in fact patterns where plaintiffs seek recovery for economic harm.228 Take Global Royalties as an example.229
In that case, the court invoked Section 230(c) immunity, denying the
plaintiff an opportunity to proceed against Ripoff Report despite
pleading that the site operators’ own conduct caused harm.230 Put another way, Section 230’s policy of encouraging online activity completely trumped the plaintiff’s interest in compensation. Under this Article’s proposal, a court would not immediately foreclose the claim.
Instead, it would provide a narrow path forward if the plaintiff could
satisfy a Sullivan-like standard. More specifically, a court could premise liability on a plaintiff’s proving not only that someone told Ripoff
Report the postings were false, but that it knew the postings were false
or were reckless in determining their truth.231 In addition, a plaintiff
would need to prove this with clear and convincing evidence, not
simply by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a high bar. But it
226. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342 (“Some tension necessarily exists between the need for a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury. . . . In our
continuing effort to define the proper accommodation between these competing concerns, we have
been especially anxious to assure to the freedoms of speech and press that ‘breathing space’ essential to their fruitful exercise.”).
227. The Article makes no pretense that the Constitution requires adjustments to the burden of
proof. In other words, the First Amendment does not compel a change to judicial interpretation of
Section 230 in the way that the Sullivan court grounded its ruling on principles of free speech. But
a Constitutional basis is not required for courts to alter their approach to the scope of its immunity
under Section 230, nor does the lack of such basis diminish the parallels drawn in this section.
Surely, both situations involve the interpretation of law in the context of significant societal change
that makes the balancing of interests particularly important—the social upheaval of the civil rights
movement of the 1960s in the former and the unprecedented impact of the internet on society in the
latter.
228. Or even reputational, to make the parallel to defamation law even more clear.
229. See supra notes 165–179 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 172–179 and accompanying text.
231. Some allegations against Ripoff Report seem so far afield from “speaking” or “publishing”
that they fall completely outside the scope of potential immunity under Section 230(c)’s terms, and
therefore, should not require the type of balancing described here. For example, it is hard to view
plaintiff’s allegations relating to Ripoff Report’s operation of its “corporate advocacy” as related
to third-party online content. If a plaintiff can demonstrate that Ripoff Report’s conduct in that
realm is harmful and make a causal connection to harm, a plaintiff should have access to damages
regardless of Section 230(c).
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would have the benefit of reducing all-or-nothing decisions at the
pleading stage,232 allowing courts simultaneously to recognize the
statute’s goal while permitting a plaintiff to develop evidence and
eventually prove a case that is strong enough to satisfy the elevated
standard.
The proposal would work in different contexts, too. Take the
Snap cases, which involved claims for personal injury.233 There, a
court would begin by ensuring that plaintiffs pled facts that did not
rely entirely on derivative liability. In other words, if a plaintiff failed
to plead facts connecting harm to the defendant’s own conduct, a court
would apply immunity and dismiss the complaint.234 But if a plaintiff
met the pleading hurdle, a court would give the plaintiff an opportunity
to proceed using elevated standards. First, a plaintiff would need to
prove Snap knew that creating and maintaining Speed Filter could lead
to harm or that it was reckless in failing to ascertain this was the
case.235 To succeed, a plaintiff would need to prove this with clear and
convincing evidence. That would be no easy matter in cases against
Snap or in similar litigation. But proving this level of knowledge
would not be impossible and could serve important aspects of public
policy if accomplished.236
To summarize, this section of the Article proposes that if Congress fails to repeal or significantly revise Section 230(c), courts
should interpret the statute by applying rules similar to those developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in defamation actions implicating the
First Amendment. Doing so would allow courts to balance interests at
play in a way that current case law has not consistently done. The approach would involve three basic steps. First, courts would require
plaintiffs to plead facts pointing to a defendant’s own conduct as
wrongful, including activity that would lead to the imposition of
232. The standard almost surely would reduce the number of cases that courts dismiss on the
pleadings. But the high evidentiary bar still would allow courts latitude to end cases at the summary
judgment phase when a plaintiff was unable to satisfy the burden of proof.
233. See supra notes 113–114, 141–142 and accompanying text.
234. Citron & Wittes, supra note 37, at 467–68. This would limit the application of this section’s proposal to a particular type of fact pattern, though admittedly not to an extent likely to satisfy
Section 230(c)’s strongest proponents. See Goldman, supra note 36, at 40 (“It matters a lot that
Section 230(c)(1)’s prima facie elements do not reference defendant scienter. Otherwise, plaintiffs
could allege that scienter—with minimal or no factual support—and often survive a motion to dismiss, get into discovery, and delay resolution of the case to summary judgment or later.”).
235. The standard here would be akin to that of an intentional tort rather than mere negligence.
236. This proposal actually is more protective of Internet companies like Snap than the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Lemmon, which reversed the district court opinion, holding that Section 230(c)
did not apply to the plaintiff’s allegations. See supra notes 115, 154–155 and accompanying text.

(6) 55.3_AKLEIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

680

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

7/23/22 11:47 AM

[Vol. 55:645

secondary liability in analogous situations.237 Next, with this pleading
condition met, courts would require plaintiffs to satisfy an elevated
standard of proof relating to a defendants’ wrongdoing. Drawing a
parallel to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny, plaintiffs
would need to prove that a defendant had knowledge that its activity
could harm others or that the defendant was reckless in this regard.
Finally, courts would elevate the burden of proof, requiring plaintiffs
to prove a case by clear and convincing evidence, not simply a preponderance of the evidence.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress passed section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act twenty-five years ago. In some ways, though, it seems like 250
years ago. At the time, the law’s advocates sought to encourage the
growth of emergent entities pioneering new and exciting technology.
No one foresaw then what the internet would become today—the primary communication platform for nearly all of society, dominated by
some of the world’s most powerful companies. Times have changed,
to say the least, and it is well past time to reconsider the way we view
the law.
This Article has sought to be part of that reevaluation. The Article
began by examining Section 230(c)238 and discussing its application
in cases involving internet service providers’ own conduct and not just
third-party content posted on their sites. These cases seem to fit comfortably within analogous liability structures—and some courts
agree.239 Other courts, however, refuse to entertain such claims, asserting that doing so would chill online activity in conflict with Section 230’s purpose.240 The Article then suggested a way to reduce this
dissonance and better balance interests, drawing particular parallels to
well-established defamation law principles that weigh plaintiffs’ ability to protect reputational interests against concerns that imposing liability might chill speech.241

237. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 48–58 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 59–70, 114–135, 180–189 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 140–149, 170–178 and accompanying text; supra notes 70–75 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 210–236 and accompanying text.
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Jeff Kosseff surely was right when he described Section 230(c)
as “twenty-six words that created the Internet.”242 But the internet has
changed us even more. It is past time for Congress and courts to rethink their approach to the law. Hopefully, this Article will help as we
look ahead and imagine what the next quarter century will bring.

242. See supra note 1.
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